Comment: R. v Chall and others [2019] EWCA Crim 865 by Wortley, Natalie
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Wortley, Natalie (2019) Comment: R. v Chall and others [2019] EWCA Crim 865. Criminal 
Law Week, 2019 (23). ISSN 1368-5589 
Published by: Sweet & Maxwell
URL: 
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/40851/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
This  document  may differ  from the  final,  published version of  the research  and has been made 
available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version 
of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.)
                        
COMMENT: 
The Court of Appeal has again made clear that expert evidence is not an essential 
precondition to a finding that a victim suffered psychological harm. This case is an example of 
the distinction the criminal courts draw between “psychiatric” and “psychological” harm, 
which can be a source of confusion. The former is associated with medicalisation, whereas 
psychological interventions are non-medical, yet the terms are sometimes (wrongly) used 
interchangeably. For example, it is well established that a psychiatric disorder may amount to 
actual bodily harm, or even grievous bodily harm, whereas a psychological condition will not 
suffice (see R. v Dhaliwal, CLW/06/21/4, [2006] EWCA Crim 1139, [2006] 2 Cr.App.R. 24, CA; 
R. Golding, CLW/14/31/4, [2014] EWCA Crim 889, [2014] Crim.L.R. 686, CA). An allegation that 
is based on psychiatric injury must be supported by appropriate expert evidence (R. v Chan-
Fook [1994] 1 W.L.R. 689, CA). However, in the present case the prosecutor appears to have 
suggested that an experienced judge can assess “psychiatric harm” (emphasis added, at [14]). 
Similarly, counsel for the first defendant contended that the trial judge had “wrongly … 
[applied] his own non-expert medical view” (emphasis added, at [46]) to the assessment of 
psychological harm.  
Although irrelevant for the purposes of determining the appropriate offence label, 
“psychological harm”, “distress” and “trauma” may be relevant to deciding the appropriate 
category for the purposes of sentencing. For example, the harassment guideline 
(CLW/18/26/17) requires consideration of whether the offence caused “serious distress” or 
“significant psychological harm” (category 1), “some distress” or “some psychological harm” 
(category 2), or “limited distress or harm” (category 3). Many of the guidelines in the sexual 
offences guideline (CLW/13/46/27) involve an assessment of whether the offence resulted in 
“severe psychological harm”. And the burglary guideline regards “[t]rauma to the victim, 
beyond the normal inevitable consequence of intrusion and theft” as a factor indicating 
greater harm. (See Chall at [6]). 
The defence here initially submitted that a court should not make a finding of “severe 
psychological harm” in the absence of expert evidence. This argument was bound to fail, not 
least because the financial consequences of requiring the prosecution to adduce expert 
evidence at sentence would be prohibitive. Earlier Court of Appeal cases have confirmed that 
expert evidence is not a requirement in such circumstances. In R. v Dalton [2016] EWCA Crim 
2060, unreported, 9 December 2016, CA, the judge had presided over the trial and “heard the 
victim give her evidence” ([10]). He invited the prosecution to obtain a psychiatric report on 
the victim, but no such report was prepared. The Court of Appeal nevertheless held that the 
judge had been entitled to conclude that the victim had suffered severe psychological harm. 
See also R. v Egboujor [2018] EWCA Crim 159, unreported, 17 January 2018, CA, where the 
Court of Appeal noted that the judge “had ample opportunity to observe [the victim] as a 
witness” (16]). The Court of Appeal went even further in R. v Boyle [2018] EWCA Crim 2567, 
unreported, 8 November 2018, CA, upholding a finding of severe psychological harm based 
solely on the content of victim personal statements. 
At the hearing in this case, the defence “modified” (at [12]) their submissions and 
suggested that the sentencing guidelines ought to provide “a sort of checklist to enable a court 
to assess the degree of psychological harm” (at [13]). Without explaining why, the Court of 
Appeal expressed the view that such a checklist was unnecessary and would not be 
appropriate or workable. While accepting that the degree of psychological harm involves a 
subjective assessment, the court simply stated that the judge “will act on the basis of the 
evidence and will be required … to give reasons” ([21]). If the evidence does not provide 
sufficient foundation for the judge’s conclusion, “the point can be raised on appeal”. 
The Sentencing Council is currently consulting on a draft guideline for sentencing 
offenders with mental conditions or disorders 
(https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/consultations/sentencing-offenders-with-mental-
health-conditions-or-disorders-consultation/), which contains a useful checklist for the 
purposes of determining whether mental ill health has affected an offender’s culpability. In 
their 2015 report on reforming non-fatal offences against the person, the Law Commission 
noted a lack of clarity “in distinguishing treatable psychological conditions from unpleasant 
but normal states of mind such as shock, distress and feelings of depression, as the difference 
is often one of degree rather than kind” (Law Com No. 361, para. 4.124). It ought to be possible 
to devise guidance to assist sentencing courts to assess the nature and severity of any 
psychological harm to the victim, rather than expecting any errors or inconsistency of 
approach to be remedied on appeal. 
Natalie Wortley 
 
